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Regarding the dispute between Japan and Red China


Regarding the dispute between Japan and Red China

We true Japanese are furious about the current government which is composed by the assembly members of ruling party (DPJ). The members of this party are actually managed by fake Japanese----their ancestors are Koreans and do not have any feeling of royalty or respect to Japan.

They released the China’s Vessel Captain who rammed into two Japanese Security Vessels without processing adequate domestic trial law and legal prosecution. This conduct spreads a wrong massage to Communist China as well as the rest of the world society that SENKAKUS and the surrounding OCEAN AREA of teritrial sovereignity is not clear. But the truth is clearly the sovereignity of SENKAKUS belons to Japan.
It was until the early 1970's, all over sudden China started to insist that SNKAKUS was theirs after the annoucemet by the UN report that there was a possibility of natural resources such as natural gas, oil etc..

It is the matter of time that true Japanese people would overturn this idiot government by fake Japanese sooner or later. We do want to have our own nuclear arms. I strongly believe if Japan posse’s nuclear missiles, Asian areas will be very stable and peaceful.

論説】East China Sea Flare-Up: Learning the Wrong Lessons in Beijing
              Dean Cheng
Japanese prosecutors have reportedly decided to release the captain of the
Chinese fishing boat whom they arrested after he apparently rammed two
Japanese coast guard vessels in the waters around the Senkakus. The
decision, a Japanese deputy public prosecutor said, was made “taking into
account the impact on our citizens and Japan–China relations, [so] our
judgment was that it would have been excessive to prolong the investigation
and his detention.”[1]

The Japanese government’s comments make it even clearer that this decision
was made due to the impact of the case on Sino–Japanese relations.
Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku stated explicitly, “It is
a fact that there was the possibility that Japan–China relations might
worsen or that there were signs of that happening.”[2]

While this decision may resolve the immediate issue of Captain Zhan Qixiong,
it is likely to generate far more problems in the future.

Sending the Wrong Message

The situation first erupted on September 7, when Japanese coast guard
vessels intercepted Zhan’s fishing boat in the waters around the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets. The captain tried to flee and apparently collided
with two of the coast guard vessels (with little damage and no loss of
life), for which he was arrested.

In the immediate aftermath of the incident, Beijing demanded that the
Japanese government “immediately and unconditionally” release the captain.
Such an aggressive response was unusual, given that the situation was far
from critical. Of even greater concern, however, was the fact that Beijing
escalated both the rhetoric and its responses over the following two weeks,
to the point of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao publicly snubbing Japanese Prime
Minister Naoto Kan last week at the United Nations and China suspending the
sale of rare earth minerals (essential for the production of electronics) to
Japanese customers. For Tokyo to decide to release the Japanese captain in
the face of such overreaction only teaches Beijing that its policies worked.

This is an extremely dangerous precedent not only for Japan but for the
larger East Asia region and, ultimately, even for the United States.

It was Beijing, not Tokyo, that decided that this relatively minor incident
should escalate. Some recent reports even suggest that the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) was responsible for the harder line pursued by the
Chinese in this crisis.[3] Regardless of whether it was ultimately the
military that pushed this position or simply hardliners writ large, they
have now been handed a victory by Tokyo. Chinese demands for immediate and
unconditional release have been met.

Weishe Works

More to the point, from Beijing’s perspective, the combination of
diplomatic paroxysm and economic blackmail have led to a desired outcome.
This would suggest the successful application of weishe.

While commonly translated as “deterrence,” the Chinese phrase weishe
embodies not only dissuasion (commonly associated with the term deterrence)
but also coercion. That is, whereas Western concepts of deterrence tend to
focus on persuading a rival not to do something they would otherwise do, the
Chinese concept of deterrence also includes persuading a rival to do
something they would otherwise not do.

It would therefore be logical for the PRC to pursue a similar approach over
future territorial disputes—use weishe to coerce neighbors into make
concessions. And there are many such disputes looming if not already
underway, including with Japan and most of Southeast Asia, as well as India.
Consequently, the Japanese decision makes it more likely that there will be
increasing confrontations all along China’s disputed periphery.

What will Japan do the next time a Chinese fishing boat is found around the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai? Or if Chinese vessels challenge Japanese survey
operations in disputed waters?

Worse, this incident is also likely to persuade Chinese officials that their
current approach to crises is a successful one. A review of recent
crises—such as the 2001 EP-3 incident and the 2007 shooting down of a
Chinese satellite, as well as the case of Captain Zhan—reveals that
Chinese responses are consistently delayed and fragmented—and
initially nearly incoherent. Yet there are few downsides for the Chinese
aside from a demarche or two.

A Dangerous Situation: The U.S.’s Two-Pronged Response

For the U.S., which is often allied or friends with parties that have
territorial disputes with the PRC, this situation will become ever more
dangerous. Chinese miscalculations (which are essentially being encouraged)
will inevitably draw in the U.S. if the situation starts to spiral out of
control. Washington needs to engage in a two-pronged approach.

First, the U.S. needs to make clear to its allies that their policy of
preemptive concession and non-response to Chinese irascibility is ultimately
self-defeating. Not only does it encourage the Chinese to be more
belligerent and less conciliatory, but it is also more likely to escalate
future crises. And Washington has no intention to help those who will not
help themselves.

Simultaneously, the U.S., in its own policies, needs to be more coherent and
coordinated. China resorting so promptly to the economic threat of
curtailing rare earth exports, for example, should be a clear signal to
American decision-makers that it is time to reexamine its decisions
influencing domestic exploration and exploitation of said materials.
Similarly, Chinese efforts to exclude the U.S. Navy from operating in the
Yellow Sea and East China Sea should be met with a recommitment of the U.S.
to uphold its treaty and legal obligations to allies and friends in the

America: “Returning” to Asia

If the U.S. is going to argue that it is “returning” to Asia, it needs to
make clear that, this time, it is here to stay. Such a commitment requires
not only maintaining a strong military presence but deepening its diplomatic
and trade ties to the region. The American presence has always been
multifaceted, and its “return” should reflect all those aspects.

Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in
the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

『台湾の声』  http://www.emaga.com/info/3407.ht
『日本之声』 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/nihonnokoe (Big5漢文)
<投稿はこちら> taiwannokoe@googlegroups.com


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